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Avian Influenza in Birds
Julie D. Helm, DVM, ACPV
Clemson University Livestock Poultry Health
What is AI / Bird Flu? Avian influenza (AI) affects many
avian species, including chickens, turkeys, game birds,
ratites, waterfowl and wild birds, but disease problems
are usually seen in domesticated poultry. Avian influenza
is an extremely rare disease in pet and exotic birds.
Are all Avian influenzas the same? All
avian influenzas are not created equal.
Birds can get many different AI
subtypes (H5N1, H1N1, H7N2). Some
AI subtypes produce no disease,
some produce mild disease, and
others produce severe disease in
poultry. The different subtypes (H and
N) are named after the surface
proteins on the virus. Even a H5N1
may not be the same virus as another
H5N1. Avian influenzas are also
categorized by pathogenicity, the ability
to cause disease in the animal. Low-
Path viruses cause none to mild
disease. High-Path viruses cause
severe disease and death in birds.
The H5 and H7 subtypes can mutate
from Low to High-Path. We are
concerned about these two subtypes
in poultry. The “Asian Bird Flu” is
caused by a particular High-Path
H5N1 avian flu virus. It is important to
remember that this current Avian Flu
is primarily a bird disease; it is not
easy for people to get it.
Do we have AI in the United States
now? The Asian strain (High-Path
H5N1) is not in the U.S. currently but,
yes, we do have other subtypes of AI in
U.S. We do see sporadic cases of
Low-Path AI with mild disease in
poultry, but these do not seriously affect
humans. Just because you hear about an AI
outbreak in the U.S. doesn’t automatically mean it is the
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The Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP)
published the new and updated recommendations for the
Prevention and Control of Influenza for 2006 in the Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report (MMWR) on July 28, 2006. The
entire document can be found on the Web site at: http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5510a1.htm.
The highlighted recommendations from the ACIP include
the following:
• Expansion of routine recommendation for
Influenza vaccination for children 6 months
through 59 months [up to age 5 years]. Last year’s
recommendation was from 6-23 months of age.
• Expansion of routine recommendation for
Influenza vaccination of household contacts and
out-of-home caregivers of children birth through
59 months of age [up to age 5 years]. Last year’s
recommendation was for household contacts and
caregivers for children birth through 23 months of
age.
• Emphasis on importance of administering 2
doses of Influenza vaccine to children aged 6
months to < 9 years of age who have not been
previously vaccinated at any time with either live,
attenuated Influenza vaccine (LAIV) or trivalent
inactivated Influenza vaccine (TIV).
Special Edition of the Epi Notes
Influenza
This edition of the EPI NOTES is a result of a collaboration
among DHEC’s Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology,
the Immunization Division,  the State Bioterrorism Training
Advisory Subcommittee (TASC), and the Pan Flu
Community Outreach Committee.
Prevention and Control of Influenza for
2006: New and Updated
Recommendations
Rebecca Morrison, MSN, CS-FNP
Nurse Consultant
Immunization Division
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• Suggested strategies to promote optimal use of
the vaccine including development of plans to
enhance outreach and infrastructure to vaccinate
more people and development of contingency
plans based on prioritization and supply issues.
• Influenza vaccine providers should continue to
offer Influenza vaccine to patients throughout the
Influenza season (including scheduling clinics for
target populations and offering at least one clinic
in December).
• Neither amantadine nor rimantadine should be
used for treatment or chemoprophylaxis of
Influenza A in the U.S. because of data indicating
widespread resistance. Oseltamivir or zanamivir
should be used if antiviral treatment or
chemoprophylaxis of Influenza is indicated.
• The 2006-07 trivalent vaccine virus strains are A/
New Caledonia/20/1999 (H1N1)-like, A/
Wisconsin/67/2005 (H3N2)-like, and B/Malaysia/
2506/2004-like antigens. For the A/Wisconsin/67/
2005 (H3N2)-like antigen, manufacturers may
use the antigenically equivalent A/Hiroshima/52/
2005 virus; for the B/Malaysia/2506/2004-like
antigen, manufacturers may use the antigenically
equivalent B/Ohio/1/2005 virus.
For more information regarding influenza vaccination for the
2006-07 season, contact the DHEC Immunization Division at
1-800-277-4687.
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High-Path H5N1 strain. The last large High-Path outbreak
in U.S. poultry was in 1983.
How does AI spread in birds? Chickens, ducks and other
poultry do not spontaneously erupt with Avian influenza.
This is a virus, just like other influenza viruses, that needs
to be spread around to infect other birds. The virus is found
in nasal secretions and feces of infected birds. The spread
is through movement of infected birds or movement of
virus contaminated coops, equipment, vehicles, personal
boots, etc., that can infect new birds.
The virus can be killed with disinfectants, heat, and drying
but, if protected by organic material (manure, feathers, egg
debris, etc.), it can survive for weeks. Wild waterfowl and
shorebirds are “natural reservoirs” of many subtypes of AI
(i.e., they can carry it without getting sick). They normally
carry Low-Path AI subtypes - High-Path AI is rare.
What are the signs of AI in birds? AI is primarily a disease
problem in poultry-type birds (chickens, turkeys, etc.).
Disease signs are variable (i.e., signs depend on the
subtype) and can range from no symptoms or mild to
severe and may include respiratory signs, nervous signs,
decreased egg production, and a low to high death rate.
These signs are seen in quite a few other diseases, so a
proper laboratory diagnosis is needed.
What about sick birds or large die-offs? Finding an
occasional dead bird is not an unusual occurrence in either
wild or domesticated flocks. Clemson Livestock Poultry
Health (803-788-2260) performs post-mortem
examinations (animal autopsies) to help owners and
veterinarians determine the cause of illness or death.
There is a fee for this service. Large numbers of birds
dying or found dead (wild or domesticated) need to be
reported. Dead poultry birds should be reported to the State
Veterinarian’s Office (803-788-2260). Dead wild birds
should be reported to the Department of Natural
Resources (DNR) (800-922-5431). State specialists will
determine if further investigation or testing will need to be
performed if they suspect an emergency-type disease.
Can people get AI? Since 1959, there have been reports
of people infected with High-Path AI types, but with no
serious illness or deaths. The first time that a confirmed
High-Path AI (H5N1) was reported that caused disease
and death in some people was in Hong Kong in 1997.
These people had very close contact or ate raw/
undercooked infected poultry. Humans are still considered
to be resistant to this current bird virus.
Can you get AI from eating poultry or eggs? AI is not
considered a food-borne illness in the U.S. Any High-Path
AI infected poultry would not go into the food chain – they
would be destroyed. Properly cooked poultry meat and
eggs are safe to eat.
What about migrating waterfowl and hunters? Since there
is no indication of High-Path AI currently in wild birds in the
United States, there is no recognized public health risk
associated with wild bird contact. Do not eat, drink, smoke
or chew while dressing out any bird or animal carcass,
and it is recommended that gloves be worn. Basic hygiene
(hand-washing after handling wild animals or carcasses)
is always recommended, along with proper food
preparation and thorough cooking.
Will High-Path H5N1 come to the U.S. or to South
Carolina? No one knows exactly when or how it may come.
Possible routes include legal and illegal movement of
infected birds or poultry products, infected migratory
waterfowl, or an intentional introduction (Agroterrorism).
Firewalls are in place; the U.S. bans all birds from affected
High-Path areas and there is increased surveillance in
U.S. poultry and wild waterfowl. Even if U.S. migratory fowl
get the High-Path H5N1 strain, it is still a low risk to
commercial poultry, since these birds are sheltered and
kept separated from wild birds. Poultry growers with
backyard flocks need to follow their example and keep
their birds separated from wild birds. Using biosecurity
(disease control measures) is the best way for all poultry
growers (commercial and backyard) to protect their flocks
from all diseases, including AI. Even with a worse-case
scenario of a High-Path AI infection in U.S. poultry, the
average South Carolinian will not get “Bird Flu” from birds.
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People working with infected flocks will wear protective
gear as a safety precaution. Our “Home Team Advantage”
is that the U.S. is prepared to respond with early detection,
rapid diagnostic procedures, and experience in aggressive
quarantine/depopulation/clean-up actions.
What about vaccinating poultry for AI? Vaccinating poultry
for AI would only be used during an outbreak to control the
spread. Vaccination is not routinely used since it could
interfere with surveillance testing and international trade
issues.
What about international travel? The big concern is
accidentally bringing a foreign animal disease through
contaminated clothing, hides, feathers, food products, etc.,
back to your animals. If you have contact with foreign
livestock or poultry, you should not even go near any types
of livestock or birds after returning home for at least five (5)
days. Thoroughly clean all travel clothing, shoes, and
equipment after returning home.
What type of poultry surveillance is being done now? AI
has been a concern to the poultry industry long before the
High-Path H5N1 strain appeared. Monitoring in the U.S.
for AI is routine and will be continued. In South Carolina,
through Clemson University Livestock Poultry Health, post-
mortem examinations (animal autopsies) and testing are
performed on commercial and backyard poultry.
Surveillance is performed at auctions, flea markets, and
fairs that have backyard poultry. A new national AI monitoring
program has started to test commercial broiler, turkey and
egg layer flocks.
What happens to an AI infected flock? The farm is
quarantined by the State Veterinarian to stop movement of
birds, eggs, manure, and equipment. Mandatory biosecurity
measures are implemented for people and vehicles to
exit the farm. Depending on AI subtype, the infected flock
may be depopulated and disposed of to reduce spreading
the disease. The buildings and equipment are disinfected
and the litter heated/composted to kill the virus. Area testing
of surrounding poultry premises is conducted to determine
the spread of disease.
Does South Carolina have a plan to deal with AI? A High-
Path AI outbreak in poultry is a federal response. The USDA
is the lead agency with assistance from the State
Veterinarian’s Office. A Low-Path AI outbreak in poultry is a
state response through the State Veterinarian’s Office. All
poultry states, including S.C., are working to update or
develop their state plans to respond to infected flock(s).
For more information:
www.clemson.edu/LPH
www.avianinfluenzainfo.com
www.cdc.gov/flu/avian
Immunization Update: Influenza
Vaccination of Health-Care Personnel
Rebecca Morrison, MSN, CS-FNP
Nurse Consultant
Immunization Division
In February 2006, the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (ACIP) and the Healthcare Infection Control
Practices Advisory Committee (HICPAC) made
recommendations regarding Influenza vaccination of
health-care personnel. The recommendations were
published in the Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report
(MMWR) on February 24, 2006. The entire document may
be found on the following Web site: http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5502a1.htm. Health-care
personnel are defined as personnel in acute care
hospitals, nursing homes, skilled nursing facilities,
physician’s offices, urgent care centers, outpatient clinics,
home health, and emergency services.
The ACIP and HICPAC recommend the following:
• All eligible health-care personnel receive an
annual Influenza vaccination (inactivated or live,
attenuated Influenza vaccine - LAIV).
• Health-care personnel receive education
regarding Influenza illness (diagnosis/treatment),
the benefits of the influenza vaccine,
epidemiology/ modes of transmission, and
infection control measures.
• Health-care personnel receive the Influenza
vaccination in an easily accessible area at work
and at no cost to the employee.
• Health-care personnel sign a declination form if
they decline Influenza vaccine (exception –
persons with medical contraindications).
Identifying these persons allows for focused
educational measures regarding vaccination
acceptance.
• Coverage/declination levels to be monitored to
identify areas where interventions should be
focused to enhance vaccination acceptance.
Monitoring should be evaluated and reported on
a regular basis. Distribution of results to health-
care personnel aids in greater vaccination
coverage.
• Incorporate health-care personnel Influenza
vaccination coverage as part of a facility’s patient
safety quality program.
Annual Influenza vaccinations are either inactivated
vaccine or live, attenuated vaccine (LAIV). LAIV can be given
to healthy, non-pregnant health-care personnel ages 5-49
years. There is a theoretical risk of transmitting live,
attenuated vaccine virus to severely immunosuppressed
persons. Therefore, health-care personnel that receive
LAIV should avoid contact with severely
immunocompromised persons for seven days after
receiving the vaccine. Similarly, health-care personnel that
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are severely immunosuppressed should not administer
LAIV.
Influenza vaccination of health-care personnel remains a
challenge. There is an inverse relationship between
vaccination coverage of health-care personnel and the rate
of nosocomial Influenza among patients. Strategies to
improve vaccination rates of health-care personnel include:
• Provide in-service education to health-care
personnel
• Focus educational campaigns to targeted health-
care personnel
• Improve vaccine accessibility
• Vaccinate leadership staff in the facility as role
models
• Support legislative/regulatory efforts that support
health-care personnel vaccination
For more information regarding vaccination of health-care
personnel, contact the DHEC Immunization Division at 1-
800-277-4687.
S.C. Human Pandemic Influenza
Monitoring Systems
Lena Bretous, MD, MPH
Medical Epidemiologist
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
There are seven national influenza monitoring systems
geared toward both seasonal influenza and early detection
of a novel or pandemic influenza strains or respiratory
syndromes, respectively.  South Carolina participates in
the influenza monitoring systems bolded below.   South
Carolina also participates and needs continued vigilance
in the enhanced Avian influenza surveillance system.
Updated clinical symptoms, risk exposures, specimen
collection, and infection control measures for suspected
cases of human avian influenza are detailed in the DHEC
Health Update, June 8, 2006.  Please see the reissued
update regarding CDC interim guidance on laboratory
testing in suspected Avian influenza A in the U.S. in this
issue of EpiNotes.
U.S. National Seasonal Influenza Surveillance Overview
– 7 Elements
* SC monitoring systems
**Also known as State and Territorial Epidemiologist Report
1. National Public Health Lab Viral Isolate Network*
2. U.S. Voluntary Sentinel Influenza-like Illness (ILI)
Network*
3. 122 Cities Mortality Reporting System
4. Weekly State Influenza Activity Report*  **
5. Influenza-related Pediatric Mortality*
6. Emerging Infections Program (EIP)
7. New Vaccine Surveillance Network
Importance of Influenza-like Illness (ILI) Participation -
Early Detection of Novel Influenza-Like Syndrome Before
Pandemic Strain Recognition
Currently SC has 61 enrolled providers and 39 providers
that have submitted data at least once.  More enrolled
provider participation across South Carolina is needed for
early detection of Pandemic influenza.   ILI participants are
encouraged to submit viral isolates periodically to the S.C.
Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC)
free of charge.
Fourteen counties currently have no enrolled providers.
More primary care providers, infectious disease providers,
emergency department providers, and hospitals are
needed to make the ILI network more robust in South
Carolina.  Following are counties with no enrolled ILI
providers: Pickens, Cherokee, Union, Chester, Lancaster,
Chesterfield, Lee, Edgefield, Orangeburg, Barnwell,
Allendale, Hampton, Colleton, and Dorchester.   Please
enroll today by calling Dr. Lena Bretous at 803-898-0862
or by email at bretoulm@dhec.sc.gov.
Importance of Viral Isolate Network - Vaccine Component
Determination
Periodic submission of viral isolate specimens from ILI
patients to the DHEC Bureau of Laboratories for viral
confirmation will greatly aid in the early detection and public
health response to a pandemic influenza threat in South
Carolina.  Year-round public health laboratory viral isolate
network participation and vigilance can provide early
detection of novel human or animal strains of pandemic
threat.  Healthcare providers can enroll in both the ILI and
viral isolate network.   To enroll in the viral isolate network,
contact Dr. Lena Bretous at 803-898-0862.
Every year each state conducts seasonal influenza viral
isolate surveillance to determine exact antigenic strains
for consideration into the following year’s seasonal
influenza vaccine.   This past year’s seasonal influenza
vaccine components were consistent with the most
common type A strains (73%) characterized via the national
viral isolate laboratory network.   Through year-round viral
isolate surveillance, the identified pandemic influenza
strain can more quickly be incorporated into pandemic
influenza vaccine production, which currently takes 7-8
months.
Weekly State Influenza Activity Report - On the DHEC
Influenza Information Website
Weekly updates on South Carolina influenza activity with
representative county level maps of positive viral isolates,
rapid influenza tests, and ILI percentage activity can be
found at the link below.  Definitions of South Carolina
surveillance systems can also be found at this site.  http:/
/www.scdhec.gov/health/disease/acute/flu.htm.
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Preparing for a Pandemic:  The
Psychosocial Challenges
Robert L. Carlton, MSW, LMSW
Social Work Consultant/Emergency Reponse
Coordinator
Office of Social Work
As with any major disaster or critical incident, the potential
psychosocial ramifications of a pandemic will directly and
indirectly affect many people: no one who is involved in a
disaster is untouched by it. The degree of impact is
generally relative to the size, scope, and proximity of the
incident or event. We should anticipate that many will be
impacted directly, but not forget that simply being part of
an affected community will emotionally impact many others.
Management of these risks and the potential psychosocial
impact of a pandemic is a shared responsibility between
government, individuals, families, and communities.
The field of disaster behavioral health is relatively new, so
little is actually known about the potential psychological
impact of a large-scale pandemic. Traumatic events are
shocking and emotionally overwhelming. It is normal for
people who experience or witness them to have reactions.
Reactions most reported include: intense fear, grief, horror,
anger, paranoia, and stress. Research conducted in recent
years concludes these reactions will occur at every phase
of a disaster and response, and may be present for years
after the initial event.
Disasters are particularly challenging for those who have
pre-existing conditions or who are already involved in
treatment for a diagnosable mental disturbance. When
you examine the fact that one in five American adults age
18 and older has a diagnosable mental disorder and that
four of the 10 leading causes of disability in the U.S. and
developing countries are mental disorders, we begin to
get a picture of the potential impact of such an event.
The good news, if any, is that the transient reactions that
most people experience represent a normal response to
an abnormal situation, and for the majority of those
impacted, what is effective and most needed is short-term
emotional support or psychological first aid. It is critical,
however, to include professional behavioral health services
in any response effort to ensure appropriate psychological
assessment and triage. A pandemic, and the rampant fear
and anxiety associated with a pandemic, might cause a
disruption to the traditional health care delivery system.
Professional behavioral health services will be especially
significant given the potential surge of individuals who will
experience elevated reactions.
As we plan ways to manage or mitigate the psychosocial
effects of a pandemic, we must employ interventions to
restore the psychological and social functioning of
individuals and the community. We must pay special
attention to those special needs of individuals with pre-
existing behavioral health conditions, the specialized
medications they might need to manage their mental
disruptions, and how best to shelter or isolate them - if
such measures are implemented. Mental and physical
health are inextricably linked.
SCDHEC Media Relations
Jim Beasley
Division of Media Relations
Each year, as Influenza moves across the United States
from west to east into South Carolina, the Department of
Health and Environmental Control renews its efforts to
monitor the disease’s spread and prepare for its arrival.
This is the time that education and awareness are critically
important, placing crucial disease-control information into
the hands of the public. DHEC and others typically mount
multimedia campaigns, and the 2006-07 flu season will
be a busy one, thanks in part to a grant from the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services. The grant will
enable DHEC to produce and present its disease-control
strategy through broadcast and print channels. The
campaign will begin with basic prevention steps for
seasonal Influenza, with messages in subsequent months
focused on prevention of a pandemic. Preventive measures
will be very similar for both.
The most recommended – and most publicized – method
of prevention is getting vaccinated. However, it is widely
recognized that medicines to combat the spread of a novel,
pandemic Influenza virus strain will be in short supply.
Vaccine will probably be months away. To combat this
problem, DHEC will employ public information and
education capable of effecting a behavioral change,
potentially making each person a part of the solution.
DHEC’s strategy: Awareness, Education, and Action.
The overarching theme is “What do you do to prevent the
flu?”
The first phase of the campaign will focus on the four key
strategies for controlling seasonal Influenza. In other words,
what can the typical South Carolinian do to prevent the flu?
The four messages will be a call to action to:
1. Get vaccinated each year, especially if you’re at
high risk.
2. Cover your cough, using a tissue or upper sleeve.
3. Wash your hands more often with soap and
friction to remove germs.
4. Stay home when you have specific symptoms (like
fever) to prevent the spread of germs to others.
The first spot will air from October through the end of the
year, potentially into January and February, depending on
vaccine supply. The remaining three spots will be used
less often in the first months (October through January),
but will rotate more equally in the later months of the
Influenza season.
Digitized by South Carolina State Library
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DHEC has contracted with SCETV to produce additional
products to boost awareness and education. These
broadcast and print spots will build on the messages of
the first four. The idea is, as DHEC Commissioner Earl
Hunter indicated during the initial Influenza summit in
Columbia, the flu is still the flu, and that many of the actions
that help prevent seasonal Influenza are also applicable
to preventing the spread of a pandemic strain.
Additional materials will be offered to further educate the
state’s population on situations they could face during a
pandemic, including:
1. The disruption of daily services due to high rates
of sickness and absenteeism,
2. Extended numbers of “snow days” closing
schools, businesses and public gatherings, and
3. The potential use of quarantine and isolation, as
well as explaining their value and why it is
important to abide by public health orders during
an emergency.
SCETV will also create a series of short video vignettes,
which can be tied together to create a full-length feature.
Each of the vignettes will focus on one aspect of a
pandemic, elevating awareness to the level of education.
SCETV will also host and broadcast informational forums,
possibly held in different locations across the state and
available by satellite channel into classrooms for the
education of children.
Approximately 36,000 people die nationwide each year
due to complications from the disease. Here in South
Carolina, seasonal Influenza strikes countless numbers.
Planners estimate that a novel strain could infect nearly
one-third of this state’s population during its peak. In those
few weeks, more than one million people would seek a
doctor’s care; approximately 17,000 would require
hospitalization. Our healthcare system would be
overwhelmed. Appropriate planning and education are keys
to easing that burden.
Pandemic Influenza Planning: On Your
Doorstep!
Julie Lumpkin, MSPH
Program Division Planner
Office of Public Health Preparedness
In May 2006, South Carolina received funds from the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to
participate in a nationwide effort to initiate Phase I
Pandemic Influenza planning and preparedness. Experts
at the World Health Organization (WHO) and the CDC
believe that the world is now closer to another Influenza
pandemic than at any time since 1968, when the most
recent pandemics occurred.  Scientists are now saying
that the possibility of an Influenza pandemic is no longer a
matter of if, but when.
 In South Carolina, planning and preparedness activities
are well under way. Pandemic Influenza (or Pan Flu)
planning summits in South Carolina were officially kicked
off March 2, 2006, with the statewide summit at the U.S.C.
Koger Center in Columbia. U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt, Gov. Mark
Sanford, and DHEC Commissioner Earl Hunter led the
summit.  As agreed upon by officials at the state summit,
DHEC received approximately $1.5 million in supplemental
Pandemic Influenza planning funds to launch pan flu
program activities in South Carolina. These activities
included an education/awareness campaign, regional and
local summits, and follow-up efforts to complete local
community plans.
As of August 31, 2006, DHEC planners submitted the
application for Phase II of the S.C. Pandemic Influenza
Cooperative Agreement for more than $3.27 million. Phase
II will fund the first three years of program activity for the
S.C. Pandemic Influenza Program in the state public health
system (DHEC). In addition to continuing activities begun
in Phase I, Phase II requires substantial effort in exercising
local Pan Flu plans, as well as training health and first
responders. The program’s success will be greatly
dependent on its collaborations with partners, such as
health care providers, county emergency managers, and
other government and responder agencies. Education and
planning will further occur in the commercial, business,
civic, educational, faith and social sectors, ultimately
reaching out to the family and individual level.
Organizationally, the newly formed S.C. Pandemic Influenza
Program is located within the DHEC Office of Public Health
Preparedness (OPHP) Emergency Management Division
and is funded through the CDC Public Health Emergency
Preparedness Program. The OPHP Pan Flu Program
Manager is Phyllis Beasley, State Pandemic Influenza
Response Coordinator. She works closely with Doug
Skroback, OPHP Program Management Director; Ted
Holland, Health Services Public Health Preparedness
Director; and M.L. Tanner, Health Services Emergency
Preparedness Coordinator, recently manager of the S.C.
Lead Control Program. Mr. Holland and Ms. Tanner provide
oversight and technical assistance for the CDC, HRSA,
and Pan Flu Preparedness Programs within DHEC Health
Services and in the eight Public Health Regions. DHEC
Region Pan Flu staff members are currently being identified
and hired to provide planning and coordination support in
their region’s local communities.
“A major intent of the Pandemic Influenza Program is to
inform and prepare the public to decrease their fear and
anxiety and to give them practical guidance on what they
can do to help themselves,” said Phyllis Beasley, DHEC
Pan Flu Coordinator. “Forewarned is forearmed. The more
the general public is prepared, the more health care
providers and emergency responders will be able to
contain a potential pandemic and protect residents in their
communities.”
(SCDHEC MEDIA RELATIONS cont'd from Page 5)
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During 2006-2007, Pan Flu education, planning, training
and exercising should occur often in local communities.
As a health care provider in your community, please
consider supporting and participating in these local efforts.
Call the DHEC Regional Health Director or Public Health
Preparedness Director to find out how you or your
organization can be involved.
For more general information, please go to
www.pandemicflu.gov, the DHEC
Internet site at www.scdhec.net, or see the pan flu
resources in this issue.  For information on obtaining a
speaker on pan flu, contact Stewart Carter, DHEC Public
Information Director, Office of Media Relations, Speaker’s
Bureau, at 803-898-7768.
Updated Interim Guidance for Laboratory
Testing of Persons with Suspected
Infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1)
Virus in the United States
(Note:  This information was initially distributed as a CDC
Health Update via the South Carolina Health Alert Network
(HAN) on June 8, 2006.)
Background
This update provides revised interim guidance for testing
of suspected human cases of avian influenza A (H5N1) in
the United States and is based on the current state of
knowledge regarding human infection with H5N1 viruses.
The epidemiology of H5N1 human infections has not
changed significantly since February 2004. Therefore, CDC
recommends that H5N1 surveillance in the United States
remain at the enhanced level first established at that time.
However, this revised interim guidance provides an
updated case definition of a suspected H5N1 human case
for the purpose of determining when testing should be
undertaken and also provides more detailed information
on laboratory testing. Effective surveillance will continue
to rely on health care providers obtaining information
regarding international travel and other exposure risks
from persons with specified respiratory symptoms as
detailed in the recommendations below. This guidance
will be updated as the epidemiology of H5N1 changes.
Note: CDC is revising its interim guidance for infection
control precautions for avian influenza A (H5N1). These
will be issued as soon as they are available.
Current Situation
The Avian Influenza A (H5N1) epizootic (animal outbreak)
in Asia has expanded to wild birds and/or poultry in parts
of Europe, the Near East and Africa. Sporadic human
infections with H5N1 continue to be reported and have
most recently occurred in China, Egypt, Indonesia,
Azerbaijan, Cambodia, and Djibouti. In addition, rare
instances of probable human-to-human transmission
associated with H5N1 viruses have occurred, most recently
in a family cluster in Indonesia. So far, however, the spread
of H5N1 virus from person to person has been rare,
inefficient, and unsustained. The total number of
confirmed human cases of H5N1 reported as of June 7,
2006 has reached 225. The case fatality rate for these
reported cases continues to be approximately 50 percent.
As of this date, H5N1 has not been identified among
animals or humans in the United States.
The epizootic in Asia and parts of Europe, the Near East
and Africa is not expected to diminish significantly in the
short term and it is likely that H5N1 infection among birds
has become enzootic in certain areas. It is expected that
human infections resulting from direct contact with infected
poultry will continue to occur in affected countries. Since
no sustained human-to-human transmission of influenza
H5N1 has been documented anywhere in the world, the
current phase of alert, based on the World Health
Organization (WHO) global influenza preparedness plan,
remains at Phase 3 (Pandemic Alert).*  In addition, no
evidence for genetic reassortment between human and
Avian Influenza A virus genes has been found.
Nevertheless, this expanding epizootic continues to pose
an important and growing public health threat. CDC is in
communication with WHO and other national and
international agencies and continues to monitor the
situation closely.
Reporting and Testing Guidelines
CDC recommends maintaining the enhanced surveillance
efforts practiced currently by state and local health
departments, hospitals, and clinicians to identify patients
at increased risk for Avian Influenza A (H5N1). Guidance
for enhanced surveillance was first described in a HAN
update issued on February 3, 2004 and most recently
updated on February 4, 2005.
Testing for Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus infection is
recommended for:
A patient who has an illness that:
• Requires hospitalization or is fatal; AND
• Has or had a documented temperature of  >38°C
(> 100.4° F); AND
• Has radiographically confirmed pneumonia,
acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS), or
other severe respiratory illness for which an
alternate diagnosis has  not been established;
AND
• Has at least one of the following potential
exposures within 10 days of symptom onset:
A)    History of travel to a country with Influenza H5N1
documented in poultry, wild birds, and/or
humans,† AND had at least one of the following
potential exposures during travel:
• Direct contact with (e.g., touching) sick or
dead domestic poultry;
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• Direct contact with surfaces contaminated
with poultry feces;
• Consumption of raw or incompletely cooked
poultry or poultry products;
• Direct contact with sick or dead wild birds
suspected or confirmed to have influenza
H5N1;
• Close contact (approach within 1 meter
[approx. 3 feet]) of a person who was
hospitalized or died due to a severe
unexplained respiratory illness;
B)    Close contact (approach within 1 meter [approx. 3
feet]) of an ill patient who was confirmed or
suspected to have H5N1;
C)  Worked with live influenza H5N1 virus in a
laboratory.
Testing for Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus infection can be
considered on a case-by-case basis, in consultation with
local and state health departments, for:
• A patient with mild or atypical disease‡
(hospitalized or ambulatory) who has one of the
exposures listed above (criteria A, B, or C); OR
• A patient with severe or fatal respiratory disease
whose epidemiological information is uncertain,
unavailable, or otherwise suspicious but does
not meet the criteria above (examples include: a
returned traveler from an influenza H5N1-affected
country whose exposures are unclear or
suspicious, a person who had contact with sick
or well-appearing poultry, etc.)
Clinicians should contact their local or state health
department as soon as possible to report any suspected
human case of Influenza H5N1 in the United States.
Specimen Collection and Testing Guidelines
      • Oropharyngeal swab specimens and lower
respiratory tract specimens (e.g., bronchoalveolar
lavage or tracheal aspirates) are preferred
because they appear to contain the highest
quantity of virus for Influenza H5N1 detection, as
determined on the basis of available data. Nasal
or nasopharyngeal swab specimens are
acceptable, but may contain less virus and
therefore not be optimal specimens for virus
detection.
• Detection of influenza H5N1 is more likely from
specimens collected within the first 3 days of
illness onset. If possible, serial specimens
should be obtained over several days from the
same patient.
• Bronchoalveolar lavage is considered to be a
high-risk aerosol-generating procedure.
Therefore, infection control precautions should
include the use of gloves, gown, goggles or face
shield, and a fit-tested respirator with an N-95 or
higher rated filter. A loose-fitting powered air-
purifying respirator (PAPR) may be used if fit-
testing is not possible (for example, if the person
has a beard). Detailed guidance on infection
control precautions for health care workers caring
for suspected Influenza H5N1 patients is
available.||
• Swabs used for specimen collection should have
a Dacron tip and an aluminum or plastic shaft.
Swabs with calcium alginate or cotton tips and
wooden shafts are not recommended.§
Specimens should be placed at 4°C immediately
after collection.
• For reverse-transcriptase polymerase chain
reaction (RT-PCR) analysis, nucleic acid
extraction lysis buffer can be added to specimens
(for virus inactivation and RNA stabilization), after
which specimens can be stored and shipped at
4°C. Otherwise, specimens should be frozen at
or below -70°C and shipped on dry ice.  For viral
isolation, specimens can be stored and shipped
at 4°C. If specimens are not expected to be
inoculated into culture within 2 days, they should
be frozen at or below -70°C and shipped on dry
ice. Avoid repeated freeze/thaw cycles.
• Influenza H5N1-specific RT-PCR testing
conducted under Biosafety Level 2 conditions  is
the preferred method for diagnosis. All state public
health laboratories, several local public health
laboratories, and CDC are able to perform
influenza H5N1 RT-PCR testing, and are the
recommended sites for initial diagnosis.
• Viral culture should NOT be attempted on
specimens from patients suspected to have
influenza H5N1, unless conducted under
Biosafety Level 3 conditions with enhancements.
• Commercial rapid influenza antigen testing in the
evaluation of suspected influenza H5N1 cases
should be interpreted with caution. Clinicians
should be aware that these tests have relatively
low sensitivities, and a negative result would not
exclude a diagnosis of influenza H5N1. In
addition, a positive result does not distinguish
between seasonal and Avian Influenza A viruses.
• Serologic testing for influenza H5N1-specific
antibody, using appropriately timed specimens,
can be considered if other Influenza H5N1
diagnostic testing methods are unsuccessful (for
example, due to delays in respiratory specimen
(Continued on Page 9)
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collection). Paired serum specimens from the
same patient are required for influenza H5N1
diagnosis: one sample should be tested within
the first week of illness, and a second sample
should be tested 2-4 weeks later. A demonstrated
rise in the H5N1-specific antibody level is required
for a diagnosis of H5N1 infection. Currently, the
microneutralization assay, which requires live
virus, is the recommended test for measuring
H5N1-specific antibody. Any work with live wild-
type highly pathogenic influenza H5N1 viruses
must be conducted in a USDA-approved Biosafety
Level 3 enhanced containment facility. Visit http://
www.cdc.gov/flu/h2n2bsl3.htm for more
information about procedures and facilities
recommended for manipulating highly pathogenic
avian influenza viruses.
Laboratory testing results positive for Influenza A (H5N1)
in the United States should be confirmed at CDC, which
has been designated as a WHO H5 Reference Laboratory.
Before sending specimens, state and local health
departments should contact CDC’s on-call epidemiologist
at (404) 639-3747 or (404) 639-3591 (Monday – Friday,
8:30 AM - 5:00 PM) or (770) 488-7100 (all other times).
Travel Health Notice
CDC has not recommended that the general public avoid
travel to any of the countries affected by H5N1. However,
CDC does recommend that travelers to these countries
avoid poultry farms and bird markets or other places where
live poultry are raised or kept. For details about other ways
to reduce the risk of infection, see http://www.cdc.gov/travel/
other/avian_influenza_se_asia_2005.htm.
DHEC Contact Information for Reportable Diseases and
Reporting Requirements
Reporting of cases or possible cases of persons with
suspected infection with Avian Influenza A (H5N1) virus is
consistent with South Carolina Law requiring the reporting
of diseases and conditions to your state or local public
health department. (State Law # 44-29-10 and Regulation
# 61-20) as per the DHEC 2004 List of Reportable
Conditions available at: http://www.scdhec.gov/health/
disease/docs/reportable_conditions.pdf Federal HIPAA
legislation allows disclosure of protected health
information, without consent of the individual, to public
health authorities to collect and receive such information
for the purpose of preventing or controlling disease. (HIPAA
45 CFR §164.512).
Additional Information
• South Carolina Department of Health, South Carolina
Influenza Surveillance: http://www.scdhec.gov/
health/disease/acute/flu.htm
• Department of Health and Human Services at:
www.pandemicflu.gov
• World Health Organization at: www.who.int
• World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) at: http://
www.oie.int/eng/en_index.htm
Footnotes
*For the current WHO Pandemic Phase, see http://www.who.int/
csr/disease/avian_influenza/phase/en/index.html.
† For a listing of influenza H5N1-affected countries, visit the
CDC website at http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/outbreaks/
current.htm; the OIE website at http://www.oie.int/eng/
en_index.htm; and the WHO website at http://www.who.int/
csr/disease/avian_influenza/en/.
‡ For example, a patient with respiratory illness and fever who
does not require hospitalization, or a patient with significant
neurologic or gastrointestinal symptoms in the absence of
respiratory disease.
|| Interim recommendations for infection control in health-care
facilities caring for patients with known or suspected avian
influenza are available at  http://www.cdc.gov/flu/avian/
professional/infect-control.htm.
§ Specimens can be transported in viral transport media, Hanks
balanced salt solution, cell culture medium, tryptose-phosphate
broth, veal infusion broth, or sucrose-phosphate buffer. Transport
media should be supplemented with protein, such as bovine serum
albumin or gelatin, to a concentration of 0.5% to 1%.
Information regarding Laboratory Biosafety Level Criteria can
be found at http://www.cdc.gov/od/ohs/biosfty/bmbl4/
bmbl4s3.htm.
Teleconference: "Influenza Update for
Physician Office Laboratories"
September 26, 2006 from 1-2pm ET
Why is there so much concern about Influenza and Bird
Flu? What do you need to know about the rapid test kits in
order to select the appropriate kit for your physician office
laboratory? Are you taking the right kinds of biosafety
precautions when performing rapid tests for influenza?
Where do physician office laboratories and medical clinics
fit into seasonal and pandemic influenza planning
activities?
Learn answers to these important questions without having
to leave your office or clinic by attending this teleconference
- “Influenza Update for Physician Office Laboratories” on
September 26, 2006 - sponsored by the National Lab
Training Network (NLTN) under a Homeland Security
grant.
Teleconference: “Influenza Update for Physician Office
Laboratories”
Date: September 26, 2006, from 1:00 to 2:00 ET
Registration Fee: $50
Register Online At: http://www.nltn.org/courses
For More Information: email mwoffice@nltn.org
(Note:  Training announcements will be published in the Epi
Notes if deemed valuable and if space permits.  For more
information on the latest training opportunities and Pandemic
Influenza links:  www.scprepares.org.)
(GUIDANCE FOR LABORATORY TESTING cont'd from Page 8)
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Pandemic Influenza
G. T. Fabian, MD, MPH
Medical Director, Public Health Preparedness
Bioterrorism Surveillance and Response
Division of Acute Disease Epidemiology
Pandemic Influenza can be considered the most extreme
example of an acute infectious disease outbreak.  It is a
worldwide epidemic of influenza. Pandemics happen
when a novel (new) virus emerges to which people have
little or no immunity. The easy-to-mutate influenza virus
shifts to a strain (a new subtype) that people have never
experienced before. A novel influenza virus occasionally
emerges among humans as part of the natural ecology
and biology of influenza viruses – originating from
reservoirs of influenza viruses that naturally infect and
circulate among other animal species, notably wild birds
(the ultimate reservoir for influenza viruses). Normally,
animal viruses do not infect humans. However, avian
influenza viruses can sometimes “jump” the species
barrier and directly infect humans. Pandemic influenza
viruses can also arise when some of the genes from
animal influenza viruses mix or reassort with some of the
genes from human influenza viruses to create a novel virus.
Seasonal Influenza
Influenza (the “flu”) is a viral inflection characterized by
fever, muscle aches, malaise, cough, sore throat, runny
nose, and often nausea and vomiting. It is usually mild but
in the very young, the elderly, and those with weakened
immune systems, it can result in severe illness or death.
10% to 20% of the population is infected with influenza
yearly. In a routine season, influenza causes 30,000 to
40,000 deaths each year in the United States and 250,000
to 500,000 deaths worldwide. There were 894 deaths in
South Carolina alone in 2003. Influenza (with related
pneumonias) ranks in the nation’s top 10 causes of death.
Pandemic Influenza
Four key factors must all be present for a pandemic to
occur:
1. Novel virus
• Reassortment of animal and human
viruses
• Direct transmission of animal virus to
humans
• Adaptation of non-human virus in
intermediate host prior to transmission to
humans
2. Susceptible population
3. Virus capable of causing disease in humans
4. Virus transmission from person-to-person
Historical Perspective
One of the earliest recorded pandemics occurred in 1580.
It started in Asia then spread to Africa, Europe, and the
Americas with high deaths rates, e.g. 9000 deaths out of
80,000 people in Rome alone. There have been ten
recorded pandemics within the past 300 years.  The time
interval between pandemics ranged from 10 to 49 years
with an average of 24 years.  There have been 3 pandemics
in each of the last 3 centuries:
• 18th Century: 1729-32, 1732-33, and 1781-82.
• 19th Century: 1830-31, 1833-34, and 1889-90.
(One million dead in 1889)
• 20th Century: 1918-19, 1957-58, and 1968-69.
The 1918-1919 Spanish Flu Pandemic was caused by an
influenza A (H1N1) strain.  One third of the world’s
population was infected and had clinically apparent illness.
Recent estimates put the death toll at over 50 million.  A
similar pandemic today would extrapolate to a modern
death toll of 175 to 350 million.  The 1918 pandemic killed
more people in 6 months than AIDS has killed in the last
25 years and more than were killed in all of World War I.
The estimated United States mortality was 675,000.  There
is evidence to indicate the virus originated in the United
States, then spread to Europe.
The 1918 pandemic strain killed a disproportionate number
of healthy young adults. In the U.S. the age-related mortality
curve was “W” shaped with high rates of mortality among
very young children, persons 15 to 45 years of age, and
the elderly – instead of the usual “U” shape with excess
deaths only among the very young and the elderly.  Clinical
accounts described most deaths appeared to die of
respiratory failure with characteristic hemorrhagic
alveolitis.  It appears that the 1918 strain was an avian-
like virus derived from an unknown source that adapted to
humans until it could be efficiently transmitted from person-
to-person.
Avian Influenza (H5N1) (“Bird Flu”)  (see Avian Influenza
in Birds in this issue of Epi Notes)
The current H5N1 is an epizootic of high path avian flu
viruses among poultry and birds.  Its emergence in humans
in Hong Kong in 1997 was a sentinel event. It provided (1)
direct evidence that avian influenza viruses can infect
people and (2) an epidemiological link between avian
influenza infections in poultry with disease in humans.  It
demonstrated the unusual lethality of H5N1 and was
proclaimed as a pandemic warning.
As of August 14, 2006, there have been a total of 238
confirmed human H5N1 cases with 139 deaths in Vietnam,
Thailand, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Turkey, Iraq,
Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Djibouti.  The case fatality rate (lab
confirmed cases) is high at over 50%. However, there is
no sustained and rapid person-to-person transmission.
Clinical Features of Human H5N1 Cases
• Initial high fever and influenza-like-illness (ILI) with
lower respiratory tract symptoms
• Rapid onset of primary viral pneumonia and
ARDS.
• Replication in pneumocytes in lungs, causing
primary lung damage.
• Severe lung damage primarily in alveoli.
• More severe in young children.
• Possible replication in GI tract.
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• Cytokine storm can increase pathology—possible
severe multi-system organ disease.
Laboratory Testing
It is not clear that current rapid tests can detect H5N1.
Negative rapid tests in the presence of clinical symptoms
(meeting clinical definition) should be followed by chest x-
ray and PCR. Cultures and H5N1-specific PCR tests are
available from the S.C. DHEC Bureau of Laboratories.
See updated Interim Guidance for Laboratory Testing of
Persons with Suspected Infection with Avian Influenza A
(H5N1) Virus in the United States in this edition of
EpiNotes.
Situation Report:  Avian Influenza
9 Widespread and spreading prevalence in
           migratory birds; broad host range
9 Continued outbreaks among domesticpoultry
9 Mammalian infection (cats, pigs, etc.) lethal
9 Virus is evolving
9 Sporadic human cases
 Most in young and healthy
 Case-fatality 50%
 Sustained and rapid person-to-person
            transmission
Is another pandemic inevitable?
History indicates that pandemics do indeed happen—
having occurred at intervals of 10 to 49 years. Experts warn
that a pandemic is inevitable. There has been no change
in the underlying biologic and ecologic factors:
• Large virus reservoirs among birds
• Extensive contract between humans and animals
• Interspecies transmission of infection
Social factors are favorable for larger pandemics:
• Larger urban setting
• Much more extensive and rapid travel
• Larger numbers of people with chronic conditions
or elder age.
The current scope of avian influenza suggests widespread
exposure and increased risk of co-infection of human and
avian strains.  Despite exposure the likelihood of a
reassortment or mutation leading to a virus that spreads
between people is unclear.
The world remains in World Health Organization Pandemic
Phase 3.
Defining a Pandemic: WHO Phases
•Phase 1     No new influenza virus subtypes detected
                              in humans.  If animals are infected, risk
                              to humans is low.
•Phase 2    No new influenza virus subtypes
                              detected in humans.  However, a
                              circulating animal influenza virus
                              subtype poses a substantial risk of
                              human disease.
•Phase 3     Isolated human infections, no
                     human-to-human spread
                     except rare close contacts.
•Phase 4     Small, highly localized cluster(s),
                      limited human-to-human
                      transmission.
•Phase 5     Larger localized cluster(s) limited
                     human-to-human spread.
                     Substantial pandemic risk.
•Phase 6     Pandemic phase: Sustained
                     transmission among
                     humans occurs.
Pandemic Planning Estimates and Assumptions
Due to the clinical and virologic similarities between H5N1
and the 1918 strain, the 1918 experience is used for
planning purposes.  The number of hospitalizations and
deaths will depend on the virulence of the pandemic virus.
• HHS estimates that in a moderate influenza
pandemic (like 1957 pandemic), the United States
might experience 209,000 deaths, with 128,750
patients requiring ICUs and 64,875 patients
needing mechanical ventilators.
• In a severe pandemic (like 1918), the numbers
could rise to 1.9 million deaths, with 1.5 million
needing ICUs and 742,000 needing ventilators.
• Under both scenarios, 30 % of the population (90
million) would contact the illness and 45 million
would need outpatient care.
• 50% or more of those who become ill will seek
medical care.
• Incubation period: 1-4 days (average 2 days)
(Note: current incubation period for H5N1 may be
closer to 10 days)
• Viral shedding and transmission: greatest during
the first 2 days of illness
• May be infectious 1-2 days before symptoms
• Infectious for about 10 days; children may shed
virus longer
• On average, each person will transmit influenza
to two others
• In an affected community, a pandemic outbreak
will last about 6 to 8 weeks.
• Multiple waves of illness could occur with each
wave lasting 2-3 months.
• Absenteeism may approach 40% in a severe
pandemic.
• The virus will have the ability to spread rapidly
worldwide.
• There can be simultaneous or near simultaneous
outbreaks in communities across the U.S.,
limiting the ability of any jurisdiction to provide
support and assistance to other areas.
• There will be enormous demands on the
healthcare system
• Potential disruption of national and community
infrastructure - including transportation,
(Continued on Page 12)
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commerce, utilities, and public safety - due to
widespread illness and death among workers
and their families and concern about ongoing
exposure to the virus.
Interventions to Lessen Impact of Disease.
1.  Vaccine. The cornerstone for controlling an influenza
pandemic is the development of an effective vaccine.
Current vaccines against seasonal influenza will not
protect against a pandemic influenza strain. With
current technology, the development of a pandemic
influenza strain will take 4 to 7 months after identifying
the pandemic strain. Manufacturing capacity will be
limited and, as a result, there will be limited amounts
of vaccine produced each month. A second dose of
the vaccine will be needed to provide adequate
immunity. As a result of this limited vaccine availability,
priority groups have been established. (Priority Groups
listed in HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan at
www.pandemicflu.gov)  However, during a pandemic,
priority groups could change as a result of vaccine
effectiveness and characteristics of the causative virus:
transmissibil ity, virulence, initial geographic
distribution, age-specific attack rates, and
complication rates.  Promising new vaccine
technologies are being pursued.
2. Antiviral Drugs. Two groups of antiviral drugs are
available for treatment and prophylaxis of influenza:
(1) the adamantines (amantadine and rimantadine)
and (2) the neuraminidase inhibitors (oseltamivir
[Tamiflu] and zanamivir [Relenza]).  The use of
adamantine during a pandemic is limited because of
the potential for drug resistance.  Most H5N1 viruses
currently in circulation in Southeast Asia are resistant
to amantadine and rimantadine.  The neuraminidase
inhibitors can reduce the duration of illness of
seasonal influenza if given within 48 hours after
symptom onset. However, there is limited clinical data
on their effectiveness for treatment of human infection
with H5N1.  Because there is limited availability of
antivirals, the focus of antiviral use will be on treatment,
and allocation to priority groups will be required.
(Priority Groups listed in HHS Pandemic Influenza
Plan at www.pandemicflu.gov)
Stockpiling of neuramindase inhibitors is considered
to be an imported strategy for limiting the impact of an
influenza pandemic, but it is not clear that they would
be effective against an emergent pandemic strain.
3. Nonpharmaceutical  Interventions
(See HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan, Supplement 8
for more information.)
• Social distancing measures such as closing
schools and other public gathering places
• Isolation and Quarantine
• Use of masks (value of mask by well public
is unknown)
• Handwashing
• Respiratory hygiene/cough etiquette
For More Information
(1)  www.pandemicflu.gov
(2)  www.cdc.gov/flu
(3)  HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan
• Supplement 1:  Pandemic Influenza
Surveillance
• Supplement 2:  Laboratory Diagnosis
• Supplement 3:  Healthcare Planning
• Supplement 4:   Infection Control
• Supplement 5.   Clinical Guidelines
• Supplement 6:   Vaccine Distribution and Use
• Supplement 7:   Antiviral Drug Distribution
• Supplement 8:  Community Disease Control
and Prevention
• Supplement 9:   Management of Travel-Related
Risk of Disease
• Supplement 10:  Public Health Communication
• Supplement 11:  Psychosocial Workforce
Support Service
(Supplements  1-7 cover topics of potential
interest to clinicians)
(4) Pandemic Influenza Planning Checklists at
www.pandemicflu.gov
• Medical Offices and Clinics
• Hospitals
• Emergency Medical Service and Medical
Transport
• Home Health Care services
• Long Term Care and Other Residential
Facilities
(PANDEMIC INFLUENZA cont'd from Page 11)
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Year-to-Date Summary of Selected Reportable Conditions
January 1, 2006 - August 14, 2006 *
 
 
C ondition C onfirm ed P robable Total 
A nim al bites requiring rabies PE P (2) 193 0  193 
A septic m eningitis 61 8  69 
B rucellosis 2 0  2  
C ampylobacter 135 0  135 
C hickenpox  464 336 800 
C ryptosporidiosis  28 0  28 
C yclosporiasis  4 0  4  
D engue 0 1  1  
E -coli O -157-H 7 (3) 8 0  8  
E hrlichiosis  1 2  3  
G roup A  Streptococcal Invasive 56 0  56 
G iardiasis 65 1  66 
H ae mophilus Influenza b , Invasive  27 0  27 
H epatits A  14 0  14 
H epatitis B  (acute) 53 7  60 
H epatitis B  (chronic) 409 36 445 
H epatitis C  (chronic) 1828 1167 2995 
H epatitis D  1 0  1  
H epatitis E  1 0  1  
H IV infection / A ID S (4) 431 0  431 
Influenza isolates 30 0  30 
Invasive S . pneu moniae 161 2  163 
K aw asaki d isease 2 0  2  
L egionellosis 3 0  3  
L isteria 5 0  5  
L yme D isease 7 2  9  
M alaria  7 0  7  
M eningococcal D isease 15 0  15 
M umps 4 0  4  
Pertussis 98 13 111 
R ocky M ountain Spotted Fever 2 20 22 
Salm onellosis 517 2  519 
Shigellosis 70 0  70 
T etanus 1 0  1  
T uberculosis 115 0  115 
V ancomycin resistant enteroccoccus 20 0  20 
V ibrio parahem olyticus 3 0  3  
V ibrio vulnificus 1 0  1  
T O T A L  4842 1597 6439 
 
(1)   This report does not include reportable STD  conditions 
(2)   PEP : R abies P ost-exposure prophylaxis with  H R IG  + 5  doses of rabies vaccine  
(3)  Includes closely related microbiologic variants such as Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli (STEC ) 
(4)   H IV /A ID S figures are through June 30, 2006 
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